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Abstract 
Patrick J. Connolly 
Locke’s Ideational Account of Causation 
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson) 
 
Commentators have long alleged that Locke has no consistent or coherent 
account of causation.  My purpose in this paper is to challenge this claim and present 
a new interpretation of Locke on causation.  The key feature of my interpretation is 
that it situates Locke’s account of causation squarely within his theory of ideas.  First, 
I will discuss the work of previous commentators and explain why they found 
Locke’s account to be a failure.  Then, primarily through a close examination of Book 
II Chapter 26 of the Essay, I will offer an alternative account of Locke’s view of 
causation.  I will spend considerable time demonstrating and defending the ideational 
nature of this account.  Finally, I will consider the implications my reading has for 
Lockean perception and an objection which pertains to the nature of real ideas. 
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Commentators have long alleged that Locke has no consistent or coherent account of 
causation.  My purpose in this paper is to challenge this claim and present a new 
interpretation of Locke on causation.  The key feature of my interpretation is that it situates 
Locke’s account of causation squarely within his theory of ideas.  I will proceed as follows.  
First, I will discuss the work of previous commentators and explain why they found Locke’s 
account to be a failure.  Then, primarily through a close examination of Book II Chapter 26 
of the Essay, I will offer an alternative account of Locke’s view of causation.  I will spend 
considerable time demonstrating and defending the ideational nature of this account.  
Historical evidence from Locke’s drafts and early critics will be used to defend the 
plausibility of my reading.  Finally, I will consider the implications my reading has for 
Lockean perception and an objection which pertains to the nature of real ideas. 
 Locke’s account of causation has received little attention in the secondary literature.  
Compared to more popular topics like substance, abstraction, personal identity, and the 
primary-secondary quality distinction causation has been largely ignored.  Discussions of 
causation in the early modern period tend to be discussions about Hume.  Hume’s analysis of 
causation is much more sophisticated than those found in his predecessors.  And Hume’s 
views have had significant historical resonance.  So, in a sense, it is unsurprising that Locke’s 
account would go overlooked, or would be examined not on its own merits and in the context 
of the Essay, but rather in comparison to or as a predecessor to Hume’s account.1 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Coventry 2003 pages 97-99 for citations to those concerned with making the comparison. 
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 What little reception Locke’s account has enjoyed, however, has been largely 
negative.  As far back as 1937 R. I. Aaron called the language in II.26 “laborious and 
unsatisfactory” and concludes that “Locke’s theory of causality fails because his analysis of 
our experience of the causal relation fails.”2  D. J. O’Connor says that Locke’s account of 
causation is “one of the least satisfying features of the Essay.”3  Michael Ayers writes that 
the account of cause and effect is “unemphatic”, “unsatisfying” and “hardly more than an 
appendix to the chapter on ideas of relations.”4  Much more recently, Angela Coventry notes 
previous negative reviews and concurs, claiming that the account is “brief and lacking in 
depth.”5 
 The source of discontent for most of these commentators is the same.  The complaint 
most often voiced is that Locke, though he tries to be a realist about causation, simply fails to 
provide an account of causation between bodies or causation between bodies and minds.  The 
consensus is that Locke believes we experience real causal powers in the mind but that when 
he tries to extrapolate out and claim that we experience real causal powers in bodies he fails.  
Collins sums this perspective up as nicely as anyone when he writes that: “Locke is not 
content to let the analysis [of causation] remain only within the realm of ideas.  His 
examination of alteration among ideas is intended to lead to the affirmation of real causal 
agents and operations.”6  The complaint is that Locke fails in his intentions and “the 
                                                          
2
 Aaron 1937, pages 182, 187. 
 
3
 O’Connor 1967, page 94. 
 
4
 Ayers 1991, volume 1 page 163. 
 
5
 Coventry 2003, page 96. 
 
6
 Collins 1967, page 24. 
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transition from ideal to real causation is not adequately made.”7  Aaron echoes the same point 
by claiming that at the most crucial moment in his account of causation Locke fails to deliver 
and instead he merely “lapses into his accustomed agnosticism about the external world.”8 
 If these commentators are right that Locke’s purpose was to describe real causation 
between external world objects then they are absolutely correct.  The account given by Locke 
can do nothing of the kind.  Indeed, causation would be a low point of the Essay and would 
call into question Locke’s philosophical abilities.  This alone, merely on grounds of charity, 
should gives us pause.  My proposal is that the complaint that Locke fails to establish real 
causation between bodies misunderstands his project.  I think Locke would allege that these 
commentators are upset that God failed to give them wings with which to fly and are 
therefore content to sit still and perish, rather than to use the perfectly good legs God did give 
them to walk.9  Put differently, Locke was acutely aware of the severe limitations on human 
knowledge and this is reflected in his account of causation.  I propose we read Locke not as 
trying but failing to give an account of physical causation, but rather as giving an account of 
external causation which takes into account our limited epistemic abilities. 
 Thus, my position is that Locke gives a clear and adequate account of causation.  
Further, it is one which is in accord with his theory of ideas and epistemic humility about the 
external world.  Before describing this account I have a few preliminary remarks.  In this 
paper I wish to defend the position that Locke is deeply irrealist about causation involving 
external world objects.  I also wish to defend the position that all causal claims involving 
external world objects can be broken down into claims about ideas.  Put negatively, I will 
                                                          
7
 Collins 1967, page 25. 
8
 Aaron 1937, page 184. 
 
9
 Cf Locke 1975, Introduction §5. 
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defend the position that Locke did not intend to demonstrate real causation between objects 
and he did not intend to claim that we observe causal powers in objects.  It is commonly 
thought that in Book II Chapter 21 of the Essay (‘Of Power’) Locke commits himself to 
realism about what we might now call mental causation.  He is thought to claim that we 
directly experience causal power in the mental realm.  With regard to these two claims about 
mental causation I am agnostic.  My paper will be largely unconcerned with them. 
The key text for my interpretation is the section of the Essay specifically devoted to 
causation: Book II, Chapter 26.  This section is entitled “Of Cause and Effect, and other 
Relations.”  Although only two sections of the chapter are devoted to causation, the two 
sections are tolerably clear and lay a clean foundation for an account of causation.  Locke 
begins by noting that we are aware of the constant changes which occur in our perceptions; 
our senses pay attention to what he terms “the constant vicissitude of things.”10  Locke says 
that it is from the observation of these changes that we come to get our ideas of cause and 
effect.  As he writes, “whatever is considered by us, to conduce or operate, to the producing 
any particular simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, whether substance, or mode, which 
did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated 
by us.”11  Locke next goes on to distinguish between four ways of classifying causation: 
creation, generation, making, and alternation. 
One of Locke’s examples might serve to help illustrate his account.  Consider an 
agent watching the events of a bonfire.  Initially, the agent will have a great number of 
simple ideas combined together to form the complex idea of wood.  A complex idea of fire 
                                                          
10
 2.26.1.  All Locke references are to the Nidditch edition of Locke’s Essay which is listed as Locke 1975.  
Spellings and punctuation have been modernized, capitalizations and italics have been removed.  Citations will 
be provided by using the arabic numeral for the book, then the chapter, then the section. 
 
11
 2.26.1. 
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will be introduced to the wood.  Slowly, the fire will consume the wood.  In observing this 
process the agent will be struck by the variations in the ideas she is receiving from sensation, 
by the changes that occur.  After the bonfire, there will be a new collection of simple ideas 
which form the complex idea of substance which the agent recognizes as ash.  The ash 
substance will be located where the wood substance was previous to the introduction of fire.  
Thus, the agent will come to form ideas about the relations that hold between wood, ash, and 
fire.  Specifically, the agent will come to believe that fire is the cause of ash, and that ashes 
are the effects of fire.  This will be the case because fire was seen to introduce changes to the 
simple ideas comprising the complex idea of wood and these changes resulted in a new 
complex idea of ash. 
There is one feature of Locke’s account which I take to be of overwhelming 
importance when constructing an interpretation of II.26.  This feature is the ideational nature 
of Locke’s account.  Simply put, whenever Locke is speaking about causation he is speaking 
about ideas and relations that hold between them.  Both causes and actors are ideas and both 
effects and patients are ideas.  The account of causation should be seen in light of Locke’s 
larger Book II project of developing a theory of ideas; it is a piece of epistemology and not a 
piece of ontology.  Even if we are ignorant of the causal processes in the external world we 
are still perfectly correct and justified in making the attributions of causation that we do.  
This is because the proper domain of these attributions is the ideational realm, to which we 
have access, not the physical realm, to which we do not.  And within the ideational real 
Locke grants great liberty to agents claiming that a cause is just whichever idea we choose.12  
If we were to begin talking about causal relations between mind-independent, external world 
objects then we would be speaking nonsense.  Any time a Lockean agent claims that “a red 
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 Except in the case of some logical inconsistency.  Cf. footnote 58. 
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billiard ball careened into that blue billiard ball and caused it to move” the agent must be 
using “red billiard ball” to refer to a complex idea and not to a physical mind-independent 
object.   
In seeking to justify my claim that the account of causation should be understood 
within the theory of ideas I will seek to offer three kinds of evidence.  The first kind is 
textual, the second is philosophical, and the third is historical.  Some of the best textual 
evidence for my thesis has already been seen.  Locke’s initial formulation of causation is 
highly telling.  He writes that a cause is something “considered by us” to be x.  The 
“considered by us” phrase is essential.13  I think it is rather clear evidence that causation is a 
matter of attribution by a perceiver, and not a fact about the physical world.  Also, Locke has 
previously told us that all and only ideas can be considered by the mind.14  Thus, if a cause is 
considered by the mind, a cause must be an idea.  In this same sentence Locke also suggest 
that something gets to be a cause not in virtue of a relation it bears to something in the 
external world, but rather in virtue of a relation it has “in our minds.” 
Locke uses great care in constructing the two examples he gives in the chapter.  He 
uses the example of heat causing wax to melt and the aforementioned example of fire turning 
wood to ash.15  In the first example, Locke is very careful to mention that the effect, namely 
fluidity, is a simple idea and that the cause, namely heat, is another simple idea.  Similarly in 
the second example, Locke is very careful to mention that the effects of the fire, namely 
ashes, are a complex idea composed of simple ideas.  And this time Locke also mentions that 
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 I think phrases of this type are especially telling in the early modern period.  The “considered as” or 
“conceived as” locutions very often denote that something is dependent on a mental, rather than a physical, 
entity for its status. 
 
14
 1.1.8: an idea is “whatever it is, which the mind can be employed about in thinking.” 
 
15
 It is interesting that both of Locke’s examples involve heat as a cause. 
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the substance undergoing a change, namely the wood, is a complex idea formed from a 
collection of simple ideas.16  Locke is much more careful in this passage than he normally is 
to highlight the ideational nature of his subject.  Normally when Locke wishes to refer to the 
idea of x he will just refer to x as a kind of shorthand.  And he nearly never pauses to remind 
his readers that complex ideas are just compounds of simple ideas.  My suggestion is that 
Locke is being intentionally careful here to avoid giving the impression that he believes in 
real causation. 
I think the most decisive text for viewing the theory of causation as ideational comes 
at the very end of 2.26.2.  Locke writes that “the notion of cause and effect, has its rise from 
ideas, received by sensation or reflection; and that this relation, how comprehensive soever, 
terminates at last in them.”17  I take this to mean that Locke thinks real causation is never 
directly observed, but is rather a product of our ideational structuring.  Locke nowhere in the 
chapter undertakes an investigation of how causal processes occur or what are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for causation.  Rather he contents himself with addressing the 
connections between ideas.  He even writes that “to have the idea of cause and effect it 
suffices to consider any simple idea, or substance, as beginning to exist, by the operation of 
some other, without knowing the manner of that operation.”18  I take it that a realist account 
of causation, one concerned with examining the causal nature of objects, would care a great 
deal about the details of causal operations.  But Locke’s claim is that merely perceiving one 
idea changing another is sufficient for understanding causation. 
                                                          
16
 I think this point is of special importance.  My position is that whenever Locke uses the word substance, or 
mentions a specific substance, in a causal context he is talking about our idea or substance, or our idea of that 
specific substance.  Locke’s epistemic concerns about substance are well known, and I take them as supporting 
my ideational usage. 
 
17
 2.26.2. 
 
18
 2.26.2. 
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There is a passage in the chapter on mixed modes (II.22) which supports my points in 
the above paragraph.  Here Locke is talking about the “efficacy” which produces change and 
calls it “action.”  Locke concludes that whatever action may actually be, he can get no better 
grasp on it than to claim it is identical with modes of thought and willing in the mental case, 
and changes in motion in the material case.  He claims that any other idea of action is as 
foreign and mysterious to him as are “the ideas of colors to a blind man.”19  Locke thinks 
there is a general ignorance of true causal processes and highlights this with a linguistic point 
claiming that “many words, which seem to express some action, signify nothing of the 
action, or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with some circumstances of the subject 
wrought on, or cause operating.”20  Locke goes on to give an example of an instance where 
we would commonly attribute causation without a full understanding of the processes 
involved:  “when a country-man says, the cold freezes water, though the word freezing seems 
to import some action, yet truly it signifies nothing, but the effect, viz. that water, that was 
before fluid, is become hard and consistent, without containing any idea of the action 
whereby it is done.”  I think this is more evidence that Locke is declining to offer an account 
of real causation.  Rather, he is happy to observe phenomenal changes and from these make 
attributions of causation. 
Some things remain to be said about power, and its ideational status in physical 
causation.  As I said above, I am agnostic with regard to whether or not Locke believes we 
experience real causal powers in instances of mental causation.  I am committed to Locke 
believing that we do not directly experience real causal powers in cases of physical 
                                                          
19
 2.22.11. 
 
20
 2.22.11. 
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causation.21  What then are the powers which Locke refers to as being in bodies?  My answer 
is that they are constituent ideas in our complex ideas of those bodies. 
The first thing to note about Locke’s chapter on power (II.21), other than perhaps its 
length and complexity, is the deep similarity between its first section and the first section of 
the chapter on causation.  Both chapters are seeking to make sense of the constant changes 
the mind perceives in its ideas.  And in the chapter on powers Locke is once again committed 
to analyzing this change in our sensations through the theory of ideas: “we cannot observe 
any alternation to be made in, or operation upon any thing but by the observable change of its 
sensible ideas; nor conceive any alternation to be made, but by conceiving a change of some 
of its ideas.”22  I think the drive to postulate powers comes from the same source that the 
drive to denominate something a cause come from; namely the urge to make sense of our 
changing ideas.  Positing powers is a precondition for making sense of experience:  
“whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere, able to make that 
change, as well as a possibility in the thing it self to receive it.”23 
In the above paragraph I have indicated that power, like causation, is not observed in 
physical objects.  But there is a further question as to its status in Locke’s ontology.  My 
position is that powers possessed by external objects are just ideas.  I think there is sufficient 
evidence for this in II.21.  Firstly, Locke says that power is not something over and above an 
idea, but rather power is a name for an idea.24  He claims that power has “a place amongst 
other simple ideas, and be considered as one of them, being one of those, that make a 
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 Note that this entails that I am agnostic about whether power is a univocal term for Locke. 
 
22
 2.21.1. 
 
23
 2.21.4. 
 
24
 2.21.1: “…and so comes by that idea which we call power.” 
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principle ingredient in our complex ideas of substances.”25  So my proposal is that when 
Locke claims that the “sun has a power to blanch was” we read this as saying that one of the 
simple ideas which forms our complex idea of the sun is a power, and that when he claims 
that “gold has a power to be melted” by fire we read this as saying that power is one of the 
simple ideas which is compounded with other simples to form our idea of gold, and so on.26  
So causal powers, as well as causes themselves, are purely ideational for Locke. 
Above I have discussed how the text of the Essay, in II.26 and elsewhere, supports an 
ideational reading; below I want to offer some philosophical considerations in favor of the 
ideational reading.  By philosophical reasons I mean reasons having to do with Locke’s 
philosophical project in the Essay.  First I want to bring up considerations regarding relations 
and then considerations regarding knowledge.  Cause and effect are, for Locke, relations.  
The chapter in which cause and effect are discussed is entitled “Of Cause and Effect, and 
other Relations” and it immediately follows the chapter on “Relation.”  The fact that the 
account of causation is tied so closely to the account of relations should lend support to the 
ideational reading.  This is because for Locke both relations and relata must be ideas.  He 
writes that a relations consists in “bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together; 
and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them 
into one.”27  The new idea which is formed when this process occurs is a complex idea of 
relation.  In his discussion of relations Locke uses language similar to the language he uses to 
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 2.21.3. 
 
26
 2.21.1 for the examples. 
 
27
 2.12.1. 
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discuss causation claiming that our knowledge of relations terminates in and is concerned 
only about ideas.28 
I think the ideational account of causation also neatly dovetails with the ideational 
account of knowledge which Locke offers in Book IV.  Book II and Book IV of the Essay are 
often seen as being in tension with one another, the concern being that Book II is deeply 
empiricist and Book IV shows notable strains of rationalism.  Whatever the merits of these 
claims, it seems my interpretation of Lockean causation can provide a nice parallel between 
the two books.  Locke claims that “knowledge . . . seems to me to be nothing but the 
perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement, and repugnancy of any of our 
ideas.”29  So whenever a Lockean agent claims that “black is not white” she is merely stating 
that her ideas of black and of white do not agree.30  It is worth noting that at 4.1.5 Locke 
outlines a species of knowledge having to do with relations.  He says that whenever the mind 
perceives a relation between two of its ideas there is a kind of knowledge.  Thus, there seems 
to be a nice fit between Locke’s ideational conception of relations and knowledge and an 
ideational reading of causation.  I think keeping in mind the vital role of ideas in Locke’s 
account of knowledge can lend plausibility to my interpretation of Locke on causation. 
Finally, I want to offer some historical evidence for the interpretation I am proposing.  
First, I want to discuss the treatment of causation in the early drafts of the Essay and then I 
want to discuss the treatment of causation given by two early critics.  Both Draft A and Draft 
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 2.25.9. 
 
29
 4.1.2.  It is worth noting that some commentators have resisted a strictly ideational account of knowledge, 
claiming that Locke believes knowledge can be an agreement between an idea and an external world object.  
For a consideration of and, I think, decisive refutation of these view see Newman 2004, pages 276-282. 
 
30
 4.1.2. 
 12 
 
B of the Essay from 1671 contain discussions of causation.31 The account in Draft A is 
sketchy but clearly lays the foundations for an ideational account.  Locke writes that cause 
and effect “is no more than this i.e. that one thing which in my sense of feeling produces that 
idea which I call heat in that thing which as a certain kind of yellow and sweet whereof I 
have the settled ideas … [that I] … have learned to call wax doeth cause another sensible 
idea which I call fluidity.”32  The account in Draft B bears a strong resemblance to what is 
found in II.26 of the Essay.  So the idea of analyzing causation without reference to actual 
objects has a long history in Locke’s thought. 
Also important is a theme which appears in the Drafts, but has no closely 
corresponding passages in the Essay.  The Drafts suggest that not only is our causal 
knowledge quite weak with respect to objects themselves, they suggest that we can have no 
knowledge with regard to the permanence or regularity of the causal processes.  Locke writes 
about causes that he has “no certain knowledge farther than my senses do or have informed 
me and so cannot make universal propositions of which I can be assured that they are true 
unless it be of those powers which I include in the idea of that subject.”33  This passage 
prefigures a topic I will discuss in greater detail below; the possibility of using causation to 
gain knowledge of external objects.  Locke here seems to deny that this is a promising 
endeavor.  While this passage is not closely replicated in the final version of the Essay there 
is no reason to think that Locke would make substantial changes to his position. 
                                                          
31
 All references to the drafts are from the monograph edited by Nidditch and Rogers which is listed as Locke 
1990.  Spellings and punctuations have been modernized, capitalizations and italics have been removed. 
 
32
 Draft A, §1, page 6.  The matching passage in Draft B is at §132, page 254. 
 
33
 Draft A §15, page 30.  The matching passage in Draft B is at §139, page 257.  I take it that this quote supports 
what I have said above about powers being constituent ideas in our complex ideas of substances. 
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Two early commentators on the Essay were quick to point out the ideational nature of 
Locke’s theory of causation.  I think this provides another good piece of evidence for 
interpreting him as I am proposing.34  The first person I have in mind is John Sergeant whose 
1697 book Solid Philosophy Asserted was almost entirely devoted to critiques of Locke.35  
Sergeant, when discussing cause and effect claims that Locke: “acquaints us very exactly, 
how we gain the ideas of them by our senses; but he proceeds not to show us, (which yet he 
often does in other occasions) in what the nature of causality consists.”36  Invoking a theme 
which pervades the book he rhetorically asks what good it is to have idea upon idea if we still 
never “attain to true knowledge of the things, from which we gleaned them.”37  Locke owned 
a copy of Sergeant’s book and wrote in it 117 notes, correcting certain misinterpretations and 
responding to various points.38  It bears mentioning that Locke does not leave a note 
objecting to Sergeant’s characterization of his views on causation.  Quite the opposite occurs.  
When Sergeant goes on to proffer his own views of causation, which make reference actual 
external objects, Locke mocks his position with a simple reductio argument.39 
Henry Lee was another of Locke’s contemporaries who devoted a book to criticisms 
of the Essay.  Lee’s interpretation of Locke on causation, in his 1704 book Anti-Scepticism, is 
strikingly similar to Sergeant’s.  Lee is frustrated when Locke claims that “the simple idea of 
                                                          
34
 This is not to suggest that every early contemporary commentator on the Essay was correct (or even 
competent) in his or her interpretation of Locke.  But early commentators do often have valuable insights and 
are able to avoid anachronistic thinking. 
 
35
 For more on Sergeant see Krook 1993. 
 
36
 Sergeant 1697, page 254.  Spellings and punctuations have been modernized, capitalizations and italics have 
been removed. 
 
37
 Sergeant 1697, page 255.  Locke actually owned several works by Sergeant, cf. Locke 1971, page 230. 
 
38
 Cf. Yolton 1951 for some analysis of the marginalia. 
 
39
 Locke’s marginalia can be see in Sergeant 1984, the note I refer to is on page 255. 
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heat is the cause, and the simple idea of fluidity in wax is the effect; where as he [Locke] 
owns, in another place, heat not to be in the fire itself, but only is the name of our perception 
of a certain motion in its particles.”40  Lee simply cannot understand how someone would 
attempt to explain causation without making reference to an external world object as a cause.  
I want to emphasize an important difference between Sergeant and Lee, on the one hand, and 
contemporary treatments of Lockean causation, on the other.  While both sides express 
disappointment that Locke fails to provide a satisfactory account of real causation between 
bodies only the contemporary critics read Locke as attempting such an endeavor.  Sergeant 
and Lee do not claim that Locke’s account tries and fails; they recognize the ideational nature 
of Locke’s project and realize that he never even tries.  In this respect, I am in agreement 
with Sergeant and Lee. 
The central claim of the idealistic interpretation I have been defending is that causal 
statements have ideas, and only ideas, as their proper subject matter.  Any time some x is 
considered to be either a cause, an effect, or a power in an object, x must be an idea.  I have 
shown that there is textual support for this interpretation, that the interpretation can be 
motivated by appeal to other aspects of Locke’s system, and that the interpretation is 
sufficiently historically sensitive.  My aim now is to trace out an implication of the 
interpretation that might be problematic.  Specifically I want to discuss causal theories of 
perception.  Locke is commonly seen as holding some version of a causal theory of 
perception.  Yet, such a theory would be incompatible with his position on causation as I 
have described it.  So in the remainder of my paper I want to examine claims that Locke 
holds a causal theory of perception and see if there is anything to recommend them.  If there 
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 Lee 1704, page 118.  Spellings and punctuation have been modernized, capitalizations and italics have been 
removed. 
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are good motivations for claiming that Locke has a causal theory of perception then it will be 
my task to deflate them, or to offer an alternate reading. 
The biggest problem in contemporary Locke scholarship has been understanding the 
relationship between objects and ideas.  Locke claims that agents can only have epistemic 
access to ideas.  But if this is the case, then how are we ever to know anything about external 
world objects?  And by what manner or mechanism could our ideas be said to represent or 
resemble objects?  Jonathan Bennett has characterized this as the “veil-of-perception” 
doctrine.41  The consensus is that if Locke does hold such a view then his project is at best of 
only mild interest, and at worst an abject failure.  We will never secure knowledge of the 
external world and will fall into a deep skepticism. 
One popular approach to solving this problem has been to attribute a causal theory of 
perception to Locke.42  Causal theories of perception claim that to perceive an object the 
agent must be in a causal relationship with that object.  In a Lockean framework this would 
tie ideas to objects rather neatly by means of a causal chain.  The move is sympathetic to 
Locke because it rescues him from skepticism; we do perceive objects, just indirectly through 
a causal chain.  Many commentators have gone farther than this.  Many have alleged that 
because we know the causal provenance of our ideas is in objects we are licensed in making 
judgments about the nature of those objects based on the nature of our ideas.  Influential 
Locke scholars who have advanced views like this include J. L. Mackie, Michael Ayers, and 
Vere Chappell.43 
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 Bennett 1971, page 69. 
 
42
 This is not to be confused with what Bennett 1971 calls the Causal Theory in Locke, nor with what Cresswell 
2004 calls the Causal Principle in Locke. 
 
43
 Mackie 1976, pages 38-41; Ayers 1991, volume 1 pages 38-39; Chappell 1994, page 53-54. 
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For my purposes I will focus on two recent papers that make claims about causation 
central to claims about perception and our knowledge of external objects.  Specifically I want 
to discuss recent papers by Martha Brandt Bolton and Dan Yim.  Bolton believes that 
Lockean perception “testifies regarding structural features of the world: different things, their 
possession of several qualities, their qualitative similarities and differences.”44  Her proposal 
is that Locke is right to assume that our perceptions do, for the most part, give us correct 
knowledge of the world.  This leads to a question about the justification for that knowledge.  
We are justified in this belief, according to Bolton, because our ideas can be said to represent 
the objects in the world.  Bolton’s position is that ideas represent objects in virtue of i) being 
directly causally connected to them and ii) providing a marking function by which features of 
objects can be tracked.45  It is this causal and representative nature of ideas that grounds our 
knowledge of the external world.  While previous interpreters of Locke have felt that in order 
to get knowledge about the external world our ideas would have to be images or 
resemblances of objects, Bolton argues that knowledge of causal connections and a semantic 
marking function will suffice. 
I think that the centerpiece of Bolton’s argument has to do with her analysis of 
Lockean real ideas.  Locke discusses the distinction between real and fantastic ideas in Book 
II Chapter 30 and Bolton claims that if there is any place where Locke teaches us “how 
simple ideas contribute to apprehension of external things” it is in this chapter.46  She quotes 
from the second section of Chapter 30:  “For these several appearances, being designed to be 
the marks, whereby we are to know, and distinguish things, which we have to do with; our 
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 Bolton 2004, pages 312 and 316. 
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 Bolton, 2004, page 308. 
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ideas do as well serve us to that purpose…whether they be only constant effects, or else exact 
resemblances or something in the things themselves: the reality lying in that steady 
correspondence, they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings.”47  Bolton uses this 
passage as evidence to support her two claims that i) our ideas have a direct causal source in 
external world objects and ii) our ideas mark or denominate actual features of these external 
world objects. 
Dan Yim also makes causation fundamental to Locke’s theory of perception.  Yim’s 
primary concern is with demonstrating that the resemblance theses from II.8 are at odds with 
the rest of Locke’s comments on the perception of bodies.  So he, like Bolton, thinks that to 
gain knowledge of bodies from ideas it is not necessary for the ideas to resemble the bodies 
they represent.  Causation, rather than resemblance, is the key to understanding bodies.  Like 
Bolton, a key piece of Yim’s argument has to do with real ideas.  For Yim, “all that is 
required for a given mental content to be real is for that mental content to be the end product 
of a reliable causal chain from a quality of a body…to the production of the perception.”48  
Yim is at pains to make Locke’s perceptual theory as pre-theoretic and empiricist as possible, 
but still falls back on the importance of a concept of causation.  Later in his article he 
reiterates that causation informs us of “real features of a mind-independent external world 
filled with real objects distinct from [us].”49 
Hopefully, the broad outlines of my concerns for accounts of Lockean perception like 
those given by Bolton and Yim should already be clear.  The charge I want to level is that 
these causal theories of perception are incompatible with Locke’s stated account of 
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 Yim 2004, page 135. 
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 Yim 2004, page 142. 
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causation.  Further, any attempt to learn about the nature or features of external world objects 
by appeal to causation will be problematic.  The major problem with trying to learn about the 
relation of objects to ideas is that there can, strictly speaking, never be such a relation.  
Relations, for Locke, are only between ideas.  Epistemological investigations that concern 
themselves with causation will remain squarely within the realm of ideas.  Understanding 
representation involves understanding two relata: one an object and one an idea.  When 
thinking about causation this never happens; cause and effect, the two relata, are both ideas.  
Simply put, we will never get to an object. 
There is another way of fleshing out what is wrong with the project proposed by 
Bolton and Yim.  The fundamental problem is that reasoning about causes for Locke is not 
deductive reasoning, rather it is abductive reasoning.  Causes are merely posits used to 
explain certain phenomena, they are not the actual sources or origins of the phenomena.  My 
perception of a billiard ball on a table will not lead me to the true nature of some external 
object.  Rather, I will form the idea that there is something existing outside of me, and will 
call that idea a cause.  Causation, for Locke, does not exist to give us deep insight into the 
structure of the universe and the connections between its various pieces.  Rather, attributions 
of causation are a way for us to organize our ideas.  In the previous paragraph I was pointing 
out the fact that in reasoning about causation we will never get access to an object, because 
we will always reason about further ideas.  In this paragraph I am making a different point.  
The problem is not only that we will never get to an object; the problem is that Locke does 
not even provide the right kind of apparatus for seeking out real causes. 
I think what I have said above fits nicely with another important feature of the Essay, 
a feature which causes great difficulties for those proposing a causal theory or any 
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connection between causation, objects, and perception.  The feature I am referring to is 
Locke’s constant reticence to say anything about the manner in which our ideas are produced 
in us. Of course, this phrasing seems to beg the question against those who support causal 
theories, but I think a little more discussion will make my point more clear.  Locke is often 
happy to say that God, for our benefit, created the universe such that ideas are produced in 
us, but Locke is silent about the mechanism God uses for this production.  I think Locke 
takes the manner in which ideas are produced in us to be either beyond the limits of human 
understanding or a divine mystery.50  This theme is prevalent throughout the Essay.51  Many 
commentators have noticed this sort of Christian teleology at work in Locke.52  Put 
differently, everything Locke actually writes about the origins of our ideas is both compatible 
with the interpretation of causation that I have given and suggests that the prospects for 
learning about the causal origins of our ideas are not good. 
There is one more textual point to make before moving on.  I think reading Locke as 
holding a causal theory of perception is especially implausible given that the chapters of 
Book II which address perception are situated so near Chapter 26, on causation.  I take it that 
the text on causation is fairly insistent on the purely ideational nature of causation.  I think it 
would be difficult to read in an account of real causation.  If those pushing the causal theory 
are right, then Locke must have thought that causation, in some sense, had something to do 
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 While these two conjuncts are not incompatible, my guess is that Locke believed it was the first.  His 
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also in play in §10 of the Examination of Malebranche, Locke 1832 volume 9 page 217.  Of course, discerning 
Locke’s true position in such a highly polemical work is a delicate task and it is possible he is only making a 
negative point. 
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 Rogers 2004 is a particularly good recent example of this. 
 20 
 
with external objects.  But if this were the case, it is difficult to understand why he would, 
just a few chapters later, give the account of causation he gives.  Attributing an inconsistency 
to Locke within just a handful of chapters seems highly uncharitable.  Thus, I propose that 
the texts on perception, which seem more plastic to begin with, should not be read as texts 
which make causal claims. 
As I wrote above, I think that the best arguments offered by Bolton and Yim for their 
position, and the biggest threat to the ideational theory of causation, have to do with real 
ideas.  Real ideas as interpreted by Bolton and Yim are incompatible with my interpretation, 
so it seems necessary that I provide a different interpretation which is both plausible and 
compatible with Lockean causation. 
Before giving a positive account of real ideas, however, I want to make a negative 
point against the reading provided by Bolton and Yim.  Locke is very careful to avoid 
claiming that the relationship between objects and ideas is a causal one.  Just after the 
passage quoted by Bolton he writes “But whether [our ideas] answer to those [bodily] 
constitutions, as to causes, or patterns, it matters not…”53  Locke here is explicitly claiming 
that our notion of causation is not fundamental to our notion of a real idea.  He is also 
avoiding the claim that bodies cause our ideas thereby maintaining his aforementioned 
silence on this point.  All of this is, of course, highly amenable to the ideational account of 
causation.  But what should a proponent of the ideational account say about real ideas? 
The distinction between real and fantastic ideas is made in just two sentences.  They 
are worth quoting: “By real ideas, I mean such as have a foundation in nature; such as have a 
conformity with the real being, and existence of things, or with their archetypes.  Fantastical 
or chimerical, I call such as have no foundation in nature, nor have any conformity with that 
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reality of being, to which they are tacitly referred, as to their archetypes.”54  On an initial 
reading, Locke does seem to be talking about the external world in these passages, but I think 
a closer reading will show a clear alternate reading. 
The structure of Locke’s commentary on real and fantastic ideas is slightly 
misleading given the point he is making.  Rather than discuss which ideas are real and then 
discuss which are fantastic, Locke proceeds by discussing the realness of simple ideas and 
then the realness and fantasticness of complex ideas.  The criterion of reality, however, is the 
same for both.  Ideas are real just in case they are presented as unified to an agent in 
sensation, they are fantastic just in case they are complex ideas which are not presented as 
unified to an agent in sensation, but are assembled by the mind from ideas taken from the 
unified ideas given by sensation.  Thus, when Locke speaks of a real idea having a 
“foundation in nature” I take nature not to be the external world, but natural, ordinary 
perception.55  This naturalness is in opposition to the artificiality of fantastic ideas which are 
invented or cooked up by the mind. 
Locke says that all simple ideas are real.  This is in perfect accord with my 
explanation above.  A simple idea must be real because the mind is incapable of producing 
simple ideas.  Simple ideas must come from experience.  To use one of Locke’s favorite 
examples, my simple idea of the taste of a pineapple is real because there is no way I could 
have that idea apart from having actually tasting a pineapple, I could never invent such an 
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 I think the Oxford English Dictionary can help support my usage of ‘nature’ here.  The word as most often 
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in mind for Locke here is something like OED 4a “The power or force which is fundamental to the physical and 
mental functioning of a human being.” 
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experience.56  Locke next say that my ideas of relations and mixed modes are all real because 
they are products of my mind.  As Locke says quite bluntly, they have “no other reality, but 
what they have in the minds of men.”57  It is worth pausing to note that our idea of causation 
is, for Locke, a relation.   So every time I identify a pair of things [C,E] as cause and effect, 
my idea of C as a cause and my idea of E as an effect qualify as real ideas.58 
Locke’s distinction between real and fantastic ideas, as I am interpreting it, becomes 
slightly more difficult with regard to our complex ideas of substances.  Locke believes that 
some complex ideas come to us from experience, but that we are also capable of conjoining 
simple ideas or complex ideas to create new complex ideas.  Those ideas in the first group 
are real ideas, and those in the second group are fantastic ideas.  Consider, for example, the 
ideas of Secretariat and of Pegasus.  The first of these ideas is real and the second is fantastic.  
Secretariat is a real idea because we have come across all of the simples that comprise 
Secretariat all unified in perception: chestnut color, speediness, long nose, carrot-eating, etc.  
What is it that disqualifies Pegasus from being a real idea?  The problem is that Pegasus is 
somehow gerrymandered.  We have never seen all of his simples unified in perception; 
perhaps we have seen wings, and we have seen horses, but we have never perceived the two 
conjoined.  Rather, when thinking about Pegasus our mind joins together simples from 
various other experiences.  Thus, Pegasus is fantastic. 
Above I have given an account of real ideas which does not appeal to external objects 
or to causation.  Thus, I take it that I have given an account which is both compatible with an 
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 This is true unless there is an internal inconsistency in my idea.  This would be the case if, for example, C 
was a round square, or E was God, an complex idea which contains the ideas of being eternal and uncaused. 
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ideational theory of causation and which will not lend support to reading Locke as a causal 
theorist about perception.  My account is purely experiential in so far as what matters is not 
external objects producing ideas, but rather which ideas we have had associated in our 
sensations.  I think there is one more very good piece of evidence for this interpretation at the 
end of the chapter.  Here Locke is considering possible complex ideas of substance that we 
could have perceptions of.  Specifically, Locke is considering possible things like a centaur 
or a metal like gold, but lighter than water.  He says that “whether such substances…can 
possibly exist, or not, ‘tis probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of 
substances, being made conformable to no pattern existing, that we know; and consisting of 
such collections of ideas, as no substance ever showed us united together, they ought to pass 
with us for barely imaginary.”59 I take it that here Locke is saying that what matters are our 
experiences in sensation, not external objects and the ideas they might produce in us. 
There is one more issue I wish to bring up with regard to causal theories.  In this 
section I have been considering whether or not causation could provide any information 
about external world objects.  Many commentators have claimed that it can, and I have 
disagreed.  One might think I am straightforwardly wrong.  The text of the Essay claims over 
and over again that if we merely examine our ideas we can learn all about the powers and 
qualities that the bodies which cause them have.60  So we have learned something substantive 
about objects in the external world, specifically, we have learned which powers and qualities 
they have. 
I think this line of reasoning is deeply confused and that the confusion arises because 
of the slightly misleading language used by Locke.  The words ‘power’ and ‘quality’ seem 
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substantive.  To modern ears it seems as though we have learned about the intrinsic 
properties of the bodies.  I think, however, that a brief examination of what Locke means by 
the words ‘power’ and ‘quality’ will expose my concerns.  The problem is that quality is a 
causal notion for Locke and powers that pertain to objects are strictly ideational.  He defines 
quality as “the power to produce any idea in the mind.”61  Discussion of an object’s qualities 
fails to explain anything about that object.  Rather, talk of an object’s qualities is only 
informative about something extrinsic to that object, namely our own minds and the ideas in 
them.  Similarly, for reasons discussed at greater length above, when discussing an object’s 
powers (passive or active) one will never get beyond ideas to objects; “For we cannot 
observe any alternation to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the observable 
change of its sensible ideas; nor conceive any alternation to be made, but by conceiving a 
change of some of its ideas.”62  So discussions of power will also fail to penetrate beyond our 
sensations and ideas.  So it seems that if we learn about powers and qualities of bodies, we 
have not actually learned anything about bodies at all. 
In this paper I have claimed that Locke held an ideational account of causation.  
While I do think Locke’s work on causation is of intrinsic interest I think it is also interesting 
in the context of his larger project.  Above, I have tried to trace out some of the implications 
of Lockean causation for Lockean perception.  I think understanding Lockean causation will 
also be useful for understanding a number of other topics in the Essay.  Specifically, I think 
there is good future work to be done on causation and Locke’s commitment to mechanism, 
on causation and Lockean methodology, and on causation and sensitive knowledge.  
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